

**COURT OF APPEALS OF GEORGIA
DOCUMENT RETURN NOTICE FOR APPLICATIONS**

April 20, 2015

To: Mr. Michael Bishop, GDC1022761 353/870, Cobb County Adult Detention Center, Post Office
Box 100110, Marietta, Georgia 30061

Docket Number: Style: Michael Bishop v. Nadine Bellinger

Your document(s) is (are) being returned for the following reason(s).

1. Your Application was not accompanied by the statutory filing fee, \$300.00 civil; \$80.00 criminal, or a sufficient pauper's affidavit. OCGA§5-6-4 and Rule 5 Please be advised that your pauper's affidavit should be notarized by a notary public.
2. Portions of the record included were not tabbed and indexed. Rules 30 (e) and 31 (c).
3. **A stamped "filed" copy of the trial court's order to be appealed was not attached to your Application. Rules 30 (b) and 31 (e)**
4. A stamped "filed" copy of the Certificate of Immediate Review was not attached to your Interlocutory Application. Rule 30(b)
5. Your document(s) was (were) not signed by counsel (No signatures with expressed permission are permitted). Rule 1 (a)
6. There were an insufficient number of copies of your document. Rule 6
7. **No Certificate of Service accompanied your document(s). Rule 6.**
8. **Your Certificate of Service must include the complete name and /or mailing address of each opposing counsel and pro se party and you should provide a copy of your filing to the opposing counsel and/or pro se party.**
9. Your document exceeds page limits. Rules 24(f) , 30(e) and 31(c)
10. Your request for court action must be submitted in motion form. Rule 41 (a)
11. No extension of time for filing an interlocutory application will be granted . Rule 30 (g) . No extension of time will be granted for filing a discretionary application unless the motion for extension is filed on or before the due date of the discretionary application.
12. The type font was smaller than 10 characters per inch; type was not double-spaced or/and type was on both sides of the paper. Rules 1(c), 24(b), 37(a) and 41(b).
13. Your motions were submitted in an improper form (joint, compound, or alternative motions in one document). Rule 41 (b)
14. Margins were too small or paper size was incorrect. Rules 1(c), 24(c), 30(e), 31(c) and 41(b).
15. Your document was submitted for filing more than 30 days after the date of the order granting, denying or dismissing the application or the order granting, denying or dismissing the Motion for Reconsideration. Rules 30(j) and 31(j).
16. **Other:**

For Additional information, please go to the Court's website at: www.gaappeals.us

SUPERIOR Court of
Cobb County, GEORGIA

State of Georgia,
Nadine Bellinger

§ 28:17 Notice
of Appeal

- VS -

Civil no. 14-1-1615-99

RECEIVED IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS
2015 APR 11 PM 3:32

Michael Bishop
Defendant

Appeal Court no. _____


To honorable Judge Taylor, Holmes, and District
Attorney, Cobb County, Georgia:

Take Notice that Defendant above named hereby
appeals to the Court of appeals from the order
of the Court rendered on 03/20/2015, by Judge
Taylor of Superior Court of Cobb County

The clerk is to kindly take note transcript of
Evidence is to be included with the record
on appeal

04/08/2015

Michael Bishop



[Signature] 4/9/15

STATE of GEORGIA, Cobb County
Court of APPEAL - Superior Clerk

Michael Bishop
Petitioner Appellant

CIVIL NO. 14-1-1615-99

v.
NADINE BELLINGER
Respondent Appellee

Notice of Appeal

RECEIVED IN COURT
CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
APR 2 2 31 PM '14

Petition to Transfer / Dismiss, Per Improper VENUE, Lack of Jurisdiction and Lack of Subject Matter and Personal Jurisdiction over out-of-State resident, from Illegal adjudication, by Removed from bench, Former Judge F. Cox.

I Michael Bishop, Prayfully Request this Court to review prior errors and Mis-Application's to Law with the issuance of a TPO to petitioner (Bellinger) and resident of Cobb County SINCE 2012 UNDER the FVA § 19-13-1 for an INCIDENT / CRIME that allegedly OCCURED IN the Families Home-State for the respondent and for the minor children (County of Phila, State of PENNA.) Phila. County Court orders, for Petition for TPO on 2/6/14, and VACATED Court order on 2/7/14 by (Bellinger) which was submitted to Cobb County, GA Courts as Evidence to a prior adjudication of INCIDENT and TPO that Judge Cox has allowed, the Cobb County Courts to Circumvent Jurisdiction over (Illegally) an already court action IN progress IN County and State with Courts of Proper VENUE, Jurisdiction, Case Knowledge And County, Home-State of Respondent (Bishop)

HAS adjudicated over. (Double Jeopardy) *

I WAS NOT allowed Due Process of service to *
initial Illegal TPO Hearing held on 3-28-14 (I was
Served notice on 3-25-14) (10 day notice by law)
denied Right to be heard or defend by Cox and
current Judge Taylor. (Although Submitted Evidence
that Bellinger's Accusation's made against me, are
Perjured) Evidence of this ignored by trial court
* despite Evidence of Perjury is within transcripts,
and Submitted Contradictory Statement of facts
given to Phila Courts of SAME INCIDENT. ^{which impeaches} _{Credibility of witness}
Despite Attempt by Bellinger to circumvent the
Goals of the (UCCJEA) by petitioning Custody dispute
as other action (FVA) in other that court/state
where Action Belongs, is called Forum Shopping
* by Judges F Cox + Taylor Choosing, to NOT follow
Law's, Rules to UCCJEA, or all motions to Clerk
Regarding Issues to UCCJEA, PKPA, VENUE, JURIS-
diction or Exclusive Jurisdiction from Initial Custody
Determination or Expedited requested Jurisdiction
hearings.

Cobb County, INAPPROPRIATLY assumed JURISDICTION
DENIED DUE PROCESS, VIOLATED FEDERAL UCCJEA +
FVA LAW'S and Issued Judgements and orders
That by Lack of JURISDICTION, VENUE, Preserved JURISDICTION
over Self, (Cobb Orders ARE VOID) Cobb Should

have declined Jurisdiction Per Binding Precedents and Laws

§ OCGA 19-9-48(B), 43(A)(3), §15-11-2(8), 19-9-42(3)

Anderson v. Dens 273 GA. App. 770 (2005)

and Cobb Misleading of 19-13-2(b) when Testimonies from Belliger Proves I am not a resident, of Cobb, Conducts no Business in Cobb nor committed no action's within State of Georgia.


Judge Cox avoidance to follow, what was to prevent ONE parent from abducting child from Custodial Parent and attempt to change Custody within County without Jurisdiction to do so is Violation to UCCJEA.

I Pray Court of Appeal to Dismiss, Transfer, Reverse Cobb Counties FVA, TPO from 14-1-1615-99.

~~Michael Bishop~~
Michael Bishop
3-30-15

Michael Bishop
4-9-15

~~Emily C. Stanley~~ 4/9/15



I PRAYS THAT WITH THIS MOTION
ALL CHARGES WILL BE DISMISSED
AGAINST HIM WITHIN THE
STATE OF GEORGIA, COBB COUNTY
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I MICHAEL D. BISHOP WOULD
LIKE TO THANK THE CLERK
OF COURT AND THE HONORABLE
JUDGE WITH HIS/HER TIME
WITH THE FILING OF MY
MOTION.

Pro Se
w/stby
counsel

THANK YOU
MICHAEL D. BISHOP

Michael D. Bishop
DATE: 10-13-14

x Treasure Blackman
October 13 2014



COURT of COMMON PLEAS
Philadelphia County
STATE of PENNSYLVANIA

FILED
MAR 26 2015

RECEIVED
15 MAR 12 AM 9:18 CLERK OF FAMILY CC

Michael Bishop
Plaintiff

civil no. 000 PROTHY
000300659

-VS-

NADINE BELLINGER
Defendant

Family Division
Phila. County, State of PENNA.

Petition of Contempt

I Michael Bishop, REQUEST the COURTS to ENFORCE order of custody USING UCCJEA.

Plaintiff CLAIMS Nadine Bellinger (Defendant) has intentionally removed Dependants: (Malik 4/27/98 and IYANNAH 12/18/99 Bishop) from state of PA. and with Fraudulent orders of protection from state of Georgia for incident HOME-state has ruled on for 02/6/11 incident. Despite Lack of Jurisdiction over Persons, subject Cobb County, Georgia Courts has violated LAWS of UCCJEA by ISSUING order with Home-State. Bellinger has Kid-napped children and removed from Custodial Parent and took to her home state of Georgia since 2012.

Father Prays for return of minor children and prosecution of Mother and co-child-abductors, whom willingly participated in putting in harms-way as defendant has


a history of doing ever-since year with involvement of drug dealer and murderer of Phila. Police officer by hands of her other husband of that year MUMMIU SLAUGHTER.

I Michael Bishop Swears to facts of Truth of all ive stated to be the honest to god truth.

Nadine Bellinger has moved to
1049 Powers Ferry Rd. Apt 1705
Marietta GA 30067

Where she has Illegally moved our childrens.
Illegally.

S. Love



Feb. 14, 2015

Michael Bishop
Michael Bishop
01022761 353/870
CCA DC
Box 100110
MARIETTA GA 30061

4-01-2015

IN THE COURT'S OF COMMON PLEAS OF PHILADELPHIA COUNTY

Michael D. Bishop
Petitioner

CIVIL I.D. OC0300659
TPO ID. 1402 V 7089

- v -

Nadiwe J. B.S.N.T etc. Bellinger
Respondent

Acknowledgement,
Expedited HEARING.

I Michael Bishop, Acknowledges Continual and Exclusive Jurisdiction and VENUE OVER PERSON and Subject Matter, along with (13) year of CASE history: To the above CIVIL I.D. and TPO I.D.


I prayfully, would like to Plead for Philadelphia Court's to Enforce an Expedited EMERGENCY Hearing, DUE to the Manipulation of the Cobb County, Courts, along with the Cobb County, Courts Total disregard's to Phila. County, Full Faith and Uniform Court Orders. With Knowledge to Prior CASE HISTORIES: and INSIGHT to Prior False FVA Alligations by Bellinger, Constant Prior Parimore's ON top of OUR Children's (whom were Drug dealers, Cop killer, Pimp, Bum's) Just mentioning only a few of her priors, when she hasn't tottally abandoned them SINCE 2002 (Documented withw COURT Records) But your honor you are aware to Prior Child Endangerments Caused by Bellinger onto our Children, even from the deviante Sexual activities of her entire immediate family members (Naomi Bellinger HAS molested ONE child- already) Internet Shows

This years current parimore (aaron Thomas) is listed as a child mollester and also assisted, with attempted Murder by smuggling Bellinger's GUN through baggage CLAIM's as a baggage handler for Delta Air, where Thomas^{is} Employed with, and whom SECURED Bellinger's PASSAGE to Phila. from GA. by passing Security, and Byrum Interfieked with Investigation due to improper RELATION SHIP.

With-out Elaborating further into the harm's committed to our children, Bellinger forum Shoped to Allow a court to do as she desired while Fleeing Phila. Before fact of Children witnessed ON 2-6-14 Bellinger's Stabbing to me, that Detective S. Flanders proved after investigating Bellingers FVA TPO ACCUSATION which Cobb County has illegally ISSUED to bellinger changing our Custody order because Bellinger has resided IN Cobb County since 2011 while Children and myself has continued to reside at same residence IN Phila. PENNA. 19121

S. Love

Apr. 1, 2015



Michael Bishop / 4-1-2015
Michael Bishop / Date

Filed Pro SE

Michael Bishop
01022761 353/870
C C A DC Box 100110
MARIETTA GA 30061


Your honor, Since the issuance to Cobb Counties
Void FVA TPO 14-1-1615-99 (3-10-14) MALIK,
TYANNAH has had to suffer the responsibility
of, If they TELL the truth, to the incident
of 2-2014 FVA. There Mother (NADINE Bellinger)
will more than likely be arrested for Stabbing
of there father. If they say nothing, there father
will be JAILED for Violating Georgia Illegal TPO
for checking on there welfare while waiting for
this years mess to subdue.

They should not be subjected to any of
this, Much less this weight. They are Great
Children, Please with guidance of counslors
help insure this charge is defused from
Them.

PLEASE!

Thank You.

Michael Bishop
Michael Bishop
4/1/15



S. Love
Apr. 1, 2015



IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PHILADELPHIA COUNTY
FAMILY COURT DIVISION

MICHAEL D. BISHOP
PETITIONER

VS.

NADINE J. BELLINGER
RESPONDENT

CASE ID. 0C0300659

ORDER

AND NOW, THIS 23RD DAY OF APRIL , 2010, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:

MOTHER NADINE J. BELLINGER AND FATHER MICHAEL D. BISHOP SHALL HAVE SHARED PHYSICAL AND SHARED LEGAL CUSTODY OF THE TWO CHILDREN, MALIK D. BISHOP BORN 4/27/98 AND IYANNAH D. BISHOP BORN 12/18/99 AS FOLLOWS:


MOTHER AND FATHER SHALL ROTATE PHYSICAL CUSTODY OF THE TWO CHILDREN EVERY FOUR DAYS, COMMENCING SATURDAY 4/24/10 WITH MOTHER. PARTIES AGREE TO BE FLEXIBLE WITH THE CUSTODY SCHEDULE.

WHEN SCHOOL IS IN SESSION, PICK UP AND DROP OFF SHALL TAKE PLACE AT THE SCHOOL. WHEN SCHOOL IS NOT IN SESSION, PICK UP AND DROP OFF SHALL BE ARRANGED AND AGREED ON BY THE PARTIES.

PATERNAL GRANDFATHER CHARLES BISHOP SHALL HAVE PARTIAL PHYSICAL CUSTODY OF THE TWO CHILDREN AS THE PARTIES MAY AGREE.

THIS IS A FINAL ORDER OF THE COURT.

BY THE COURT:


HONORABLE ANGELES ROCCA J.

COPIES SENT
PURSUANT TO Pa.R.C.P. 236(b)

Page 1 of 1

APR 23 2010
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA
USER I.D.:

CIVIL CASE #
14-1-1615

<p>TEMPORARY PROTECTION FROM ABUSE ORDER</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Amended Order <input type="checkbox"/> Continued Order</p>	<p>IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PHILADELPHIA COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA</p> <p>NO. 1402V7089</p>
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PLAINTIFF			
NADINE	J	BELLINGER	NOVEMBER 03, 1975
First	Middle	Last	Plaintiff's DOB

Name(s) of all protected persons, including minor child/ren and DOB: NADINE J. BELLINGER
 MALIK D. BISHOP, DOB: APRIL 27, 1998; YANNAH D. BISHOP, DOB: DECEMBER 18, 1999

DEFENDANT			
MICHAEL	D	BISHOP	
First	Middle	Last	Suffix

Defendant's Address:
 1122 N 29TH ST
 PHILADELPHIA, PA 19121

DEFENDANT IDENTIFIERS			
DOB	SEPTEMBER 03, 1964	HEIGHT	5 feet 8 inches
SEX	Male	WEIGHT	160
RACE	African American	EYES	Brown
HAIR	Black		
SSN	185-58-2783		
DRIVERS LICENSE #	20683444		
EXP DATE	N/A	STATE	PA

- CAUTION:**
- Weapon Involved
 - Weapon Present on the Property
 - Weapon Ordered Relinquished

The Court Hereby Finds: That it has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter, and the Defendant will be provided with reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard.

The Court Hereby Orders:

- Defendant shall not abuse, harass, stalk or threaten any of the above persons in any place where they might be found.
- Except for such contact with the minor child/ren as may be permitted under paragraph 5 of this order, Defendant shall not contact Plaintiff, or any other person protected under this order, by telephone or by any other means, including through third persons.
- Additional findings of this order are set forth below.

Order Effective Date
 FEBRUARY 06, 2014

Order Expiration Date
 Effective until modified or terminated by the court

NOTICE TO THE DEFENDANT

Defendant is hereby notified that violation of the order may result in arrest for indirect criminal contempt, which is punishable by a fine of up to \$1,000 and/or up to six months in jail. 23 Pa.C.S.A. §6114. Consent of Plaintiff to Defendant's return to the residence shall not invalidate this order, which can only be changed or modified through the filing of appropriate court papers for that purpose. 23 Pa.C.S.A. §6108(g). If Defendant is required to relinquish any firearms, other weapons or ammunition or any firearm license, those items must be relinquished to the sheriff within 24 hours of the service of this order. As an alternative, Defendant may relinquish any firearm, other weapon or ammunition listed herein to a third party provided Defendant and the third party first comply with all requirements to obtain a safekeeping permit. If, due to their current location, firearms, other weapons or ammunition cannot reasonably be retrieved within the time for relinquishment, Defendant shall provide an affidavit to the sheriff listing the firearms, other weapons or ammunition and their current location no later than 24 hours after the service of this order. Defendant is further notified that violation of this order may subject him/her to state charges and penalties under the Pennsylvania Crimes Code and to federal charges and penalties under the Violence Against Women Act, 18 U.S.C. §§2261-2262.

Note: Statement of event of night of incident, account are totally contradictory to statement made to GA Courts



NADINE J. BELLINGER

Plaintiff

V.

MICHAEL D. BISHOP

Defendant

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
PHILADELPHIA COUNTY,
PENNSYLVANIA

FAMILY DIVISION

No. 1402V7089

ORDER TO VACATE

AND NOW, on this 7TH Day of February, 2014, the TEMPORARY ORDER in the above captioned matter is hereby VACATED and the action is DISMISSED without prejudice for plaintiff's failure to prosecute.

BY THE COURT:

Judge EDWARD R. SUMMERS

February 7, 2014

Date

THE SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF COBB

STATE OF GEORGIA

Court Rule: www.cobbsuperiorcourtclerk.com
Rebecca Keaton
Clerk of Superior Court Cobb County

NADINE BELLINGER
Petitioner,

v.

MICHAEL BISHOP
Respondent.

Civil Action File
No. 4-1-1615-99

PETITION FOR TEMPORARY PROTECTIVE ORDER

The Petitioner, pursuant to the Family Violence Act at O.C.G.A. §§ 19-13-1 et seq., files

this Petition for a Family Violence Protective Order and in support shows the Court the following:

1. The Petitioner is a resident of Cobb County, Georgia, and is 18 years of age or older or is an emancipated minor. Petitioner's date of birth is November 3, 1975, sex female.
2. Respondent is a resident of the State of Pennsylvania. Under O.C.G.A. § 19-13-2(b) jurisdiction and venue are proper with this Court because the Petitioner lives in Cobb County. Respondent is subject to the jurisdiction of this Court and may be served at 1422 North 29th Street, Philadelphia, Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania 19121.
3. Petitioner and Respondent are:

- | | |
|-------------------------------------|---|
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | 1. Present or past spouses |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | 2. Parents of the same children |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | 3. Parent and children |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | 4. Persons who used to live in the same household |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | 5. Persons currently living in the same household |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | 6. Foster parent and foster child |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | 7. Stepparent and stepchild |

4. On February 4, 2014, the Respondent committed the following acts of family violence against the Petitioner and/or minor children: Respondent has hurt me; Respondent has threatened me. On March 10, 2014, the Respondent committed the following acts of family violence against the Petitioner and/or minor children: Respondent has stalked me. Specifically, the petitioner and respondent were

*How does
Cobb Police
Investigate action
in Phila*

Rebecca Keaton

FILED IN COURT
THIS March 10 2014
REBECCA KEATON
CLERK SUPERIOR COURT
COBB COUNTY, GEORGIA

*1/28/15 7.30 This incident
Is from Phila.,
Been adjudicated over.*

married for twelve years with a history of crack cocaine abuse and domestic violence on the part of the respondent until the pair divorced in 2010. The parties share joint custody of their two minor children. On 2/4/14 the petitioner traveled to Pennsylvania, to the residence of the respondent's mother, in an effort to visit with the pair's minor children. When the petitioner arrived, she found the residence in disarray and the respondent appeared as though he was under the influence of an unknown substance. The respondent transiently asked to use the petitioner's cellular phone and the petitioner conceded. A short while later, the respondent asked the petitioner to "take a ride" with the respondent. When the petitioner refused, the respondent struck the petitioner and a tussle ensued. The petitioner was able to break loose from the respondent's grasp at which time the respondent grabbed the petitioner by her hair and slammed the petitioner's face into the floor repeatedly. The respondent motioned to towards the petitioner in an effort to strangle the petitioner. The respondent then grabbed a machete and threatened both the petitioner as well as the petitioner's sister. This occurred in the presence of the pair's minor children. The petitioner contacted law enforcement however no arrest was made as the respondent had fled the scene. As a result of this altercation, the petitioner collected the pair's minor children and returned to Georgia. Shortly thereafter, the respondent began placing an influx of unwanted telephone calls and emails to the petitioner that were threatening in nature through 3/8/14. The respondent has asserted that he in on his way to Georgia to address the petitioner. The respondent has contacted law enforcement repeatedly in an effort to make false reports regarding the petitioner's parenting and household safety. The respondent has contacted the petitioner's employer. The respondent has also contacted the petitioner's relatives to assert that he will kill the petitioner the next time he sees her. Petitioner has the following additional reasons to fear Respondent: Respondent has hurt me before, Respondent has threatened me or other family members, Respondent has alcohol or drug problems, Respondent has dangerous weapons, Respondent has a criminal record, Respondent has been violent to other people, Respondent has been violent in the presence of children, Respondent has threatened to kill me, Respondent has threatened to kill himself/herself, Respondent has taken my children and Respondent has threatened to take my children.

Petitioner is in reasonable fear for Petitioner's own safety and the safety of the minor children.

5. At other times the Respondent has committed other such acts, including but not limited to (approximate dates and what happened):

2008 Respondent threatened me and Respondent held a gun to my head.

6. There is a substantial likelihood that the Respondent will commit such acts of violence against the Petitioner and minor children in the immediate future if relief is not granted as provided pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-13-4.

ID# 2014-0032080-CV
Page 2

On October 30, 1999, Davis-Redding drove to Redding's brother's residence to give the children their Halloween costumes. When she arrived, the children came out and gave her a hug. She claims that when Redding saw them do this, he came outside, grabbed the children by their arms and took them toward the front door. He let go of them and told them to go to the door. According to Davis-Redding, Redding then turned around and grabbed her by the arms. She wrestled herself away from him and ran for her car. As she started driving away, Redding punched her car window and tipped the side mirror off the car.

On November 1, 1999, Davis-Redding filed a petition for a temporary protective order in Clayton County Superior Court. Without holding a formal hearing or serving Redding, the court found that Redding was a resident of Henry County and dismissed the petition.

Davis-Redding then went to the Henry County courthouse to file *793 a petition for a protective order. According to Davis-Redding, the judge there refused to consider the petition because Redding had not indicated an intent to remain in Henry County and so was still a resident of Clayton County.

On November 17, Davis-Redding was served with a verified complaint for divorce. In it, Redding swore that he was a resident of Clayton County. On December 1, based on this new evidence showing Redding as a Clayton County resident and her inability to get relief in Henry County, Davis-Redding moved the Clayton County court to reconsider the November 1 order or to grant a new trial. The motion was denied on December 7, 1999. We granted Davis-Redding's application for discretionary review of the November 1 and December 7 orders denying her initial petition for a protective order and motion for reconsideration.

III 1. Davis-Redding contends the trial court misapplied OCGA § 19-13-2, arguing that venue was proper in both Clayton and Henry Counties. We agree that venue was proper in either county.

The venue provision of the Family Violence Act¹ provides, in pertinent part, that "the superior court of the county where the respondent resides shall have jurisdiction over all proceedings under this article." The Act does not define the term "resides." Nor have we found any cases defining "resides" in a family violence context. However, issues

involving a defendant's legal residency for purposes of filing suit have arisen in other contexts.

1 OCGA § 19-13-2(a).

In general, one's legal residence for the purpose of being sued in Georgia is the same county as his or her domicile.² Under OCGA § 19-2-1:

2 *Sorrell v. Sorrell*, 247 Ga. 9, 11(3), 274 S.E.2d 314 (1981); see *In the Interest of B.G.*, 238 Ga.App. 277, 278, 518 S.E.2d 451 (1992).

(a) The domicile of every person who is of full age and is laboring under no disability is the place where the family of the person permanently resides, if in this state. If a person has no family or if this family does not reside in this state, the place where the person generally lodges shall be considered his domicile.

(b) The domicile of a person sui juris may be changed by an actual change of residence with the avowed intention of remaining at the new residence. Declaration of an intention to change one's domicile is ineffectual for that purpose until some act is done in execution of the intention.

Thus, under OCGA § 19-2-1, the court could have found that *794 Redding is a resident of either county. Under subsection (a), since **99 Redding's family permanently resides in Clayton County, that county could be considered his place of domicile. At the same time, if Redding's separation from his family requires that he be treated as though he has no family, his domicile is in Henry County, since that is where he generally lodges.

Under subsection (b), Redding changed his domicile to Henry County if he actually moved and made known his intention to remain at the new location. While the record shows he moved, it does not indicate whether Redding made known any intention to remain in his brother's Henry County home. Thus, it does not show that he changed his domicile.

This is a case where the respondent's place of residence for venue purposes is not clearly clear. In such a case, it is particularly important to consider the purpose of the Family Violence Act. The Act seeks to bring about an end to acts of family violence.³ In order to achieve this purpose, the Act gives the trial court authority to order temporary relief as it deems necessary to protect a person from violence, even if

~~FILE~~ FILE

VENUE

that means giving the respondent no notice and no opportunity to be heard before the order is issued.⁴

3 See OCGA § 19-13-4(a); *Duggan v. Duggan-Schiller*, 246 Ga.App. 1271, 539 S.E.2d 840 (2000).

4 OCGA § 19-13-3(b); *Duggan*, supra.

21 Considering the Act's important purpose, as well as the language of OCGA §§ 19-2-1 and 19-2-2, we hold that, in a family violence case in which the respondent has left the family home but has not avowed an intention to remain in his new location, venue is proper both in the county of the family's residence and in the county to which the respondent has relocated. We agree with the rationale behind this Court's opinion in *Gardner v. Gardner*,⁵ "divorce cases are different from other cases, requiring some flexibility in the application of our jurisdictional and venue rules."⁶ We realize this is a family violence case rather than a divorce case; however, even more flexibility may be required in cases filed to bring about an end to family violence.

5 (Punctuation omitted.) 226 Ga.App. 299, 301, 511 S.E.2d 633 (1992).

6 *Id.*

Although the trial court would also have been authorized to find that venue was in Henry County, the trial court erred in holding that venue did not lie in Clayton County.

End of Document

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Accordingly, the trial court's judgment dismissing the petition must be reversed.

141 2. Davis-Redding correctly argues that the trial court erred in dismissing the petition based on improper venue on its own motion. A defense of improper venue may be waived,⁷ and Redding did not raise the issue himself. The trial court was not authorized to dismiss the petition on its own due to improper venue.⁸

7 See *Williams v. Fuller*, 244 Ga. 846, 830(5), 262 S.E.2d 133 (1979); *Hobbs Enterprises v. Sisco Corp.*, 195 Ga.App. 694, 695(1), 394 S.E.2d 618 (1990).

8 See *Brown v. Cook*, 184 Ga.App. 699, 701(2), 362 S.E.2d 480 (1987); *Hubbart v. Williams*, 175 Ga.App. 393, 396(3), 333 S.E.2d 425 (1985).

3. Based on the foregoing, we need not consider Davis-Redding's remaining arguments.
Judgment reversed.

SMITH, P. J., and PHIPPS, J., concur.

Parallel Citations

542 S.E.2d 197, 01 FCDR 9

FVA Venue

Venue from violence

On October 30, 1999, Davis-Redding drove to Redding's brother's residence to give the children their Halloween costumes. When she arrived, the children came out and gave her a hug. She claims that when Redding saw them do this, he came outside, grabbed the children by their arms and took them toward the front door. He let go of them and told them to go to the door. According to Davis-Redding, Redding then turned around and grabbed her by the arms. She wrestled herself away from him and ran for her car. As she started driving away, Redding punched her car window and ripped the side mirror off the car.

On November 1, 1999, Davis-Redding filed a petition for a temporary protective order in Clayton County Superior Court. Without holding a formal hearing or serving Redding, the court found that Redding was a resident of Henry County and dismissed the petition.

Davis-Redding then went to the Henry County courthouse to file "793 a petition for a protective order. According to Davis-Redding, the judge there refused to consider the petition because Redding had not indicated an intent to remain in Henry County and so was still a resident of Clayton County.

On November 17, Davis-Redding was served with a verified complaint for divorce. In it, Redding swore that he was a resident of Clayton County. On December 1, based on this new evidence showing Redding as a Clayton County resident and her inability to get relief in Henry County, Davis-Redding moved the Clayton County court to reconsider the November 1 order or to grant a new trial. The motion was denied on December 7, 1999. We granted Davis-Redding's application for discretionary review of the November 1 and December 7 orders denying her initial petition for a protective order and motion for reconsideration.

III 1. Davis-Redding contends the trial court misapplied OCGA § 19-2-1, arguing that venue was proper in both Clayton and Henry Counties. We agree that venue was proper in either county.

The venue provision of the Family Violence Act provides, in pertinent part, that "the superior court of the county where the respondent resides shall have jurisdiction over all proceedings under this article. The Act does not define the term "resides." Nor have we found any cases defining "resides" in a family violence context. However, issues

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Involving a defendant's legal residency for purposes of filing suit have arisen in other contexts.

1 OCGA § 19-2-1(a)

In general, one's legal residence for the purpose of being sued in Georgia is the same county as his or her domicile. 2 Under OCGA § 19-2-1:

2 Sorrell v. Sorrell, 241 Ga. 3, 111D, 774 S.E.2d 314 (1981); see *in the interest of* G. 238 Ga.App. 271, 278, 518 S.E.2d 451 (1999).

(a) The domicile of every person who is of full age and is laboring under no disability is the place where the family of the person permanently resides, if in this state. If a person has no family or if his family does not reside in this state, the place where the person generally lodges shall be considered his domicile.

(b) The domicile of a person sui juris may be changed by an actual change of residence with the avowed intention of remaining at the new residence. Declaration of an intention to change one's domicile is ineffectual for that purpose until some act is done in execution of the intention.

Thus, under OCGA § 19-2-1, the court could have found that "794 Redding is a resident of either county. Under subsection (a), since "199 Redding's family permanently resides in Clayton County, that county could be considered his place of domicile. At the same time, if Redding's separation from his family requires that he be treated as though he has no family, his domicile is in Henry County, since that is where he generally lodges.

Under subsection (b), Redding changed his domicile to Henry County if he actually moved and made known his intention to remain at the new location. While the record shows he moved, it does not indicate whether Redding made known any intention to remain in his brother's Henry County home. Thus, it does not show that he changed his domicile.

This is a case where the respondent's place of residence for venue purposes is not exactly clear. In such a case, it is particularly important to consider the purpose of the Family Violence Act. The Act seeks to bring about an end to acts of family violence. 3 In order to achieve this purpose, the Act gives the trial court authority to order temporary relief as it deems necessary to protect a person from violence, even if

that means giving the respondent no notice and no opportunity to be heard before the order is issued. 4

2 See OCGA § 19-2-1(a); *Dargatzis v. Dargatzis-Schiff*, 236 Ga.App. 127, 529 S.E.2d 840 (2000).

4 OCGA § 19-2-1(b); *Dargatzis supra*

121 Considering the Act's important purpose, as well as the language of OCGA §§ 19-2-1 and 19-2-2, we hold that, in a family violence case in which the respondent has left the family home but has not avowed an intention to remain in his new location, venue is proper both in the county of the family's residence and in the county to which the respondent has relocated. We agree with the rationale behind this Court's opinion in *Corbett v. Corbett*: 3 "divorce cases are different from other cases, requiring some flexibility in the application of our jurisdictional and venue rules." 6 We realize this is a family violence case rather than a divorce case; however, even more flexibility may be required in cases filed to bring about an end to family violence.

5 (Punctuation omitted.) 236 Ga.App. 299, 301, 511 S.E.2d 633 (1999).

6 *Id.*

Although the trial court would also have been authorized to find that venue was in Henry County, the trial court erred in holding that venue did not lie in Clayton County.

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SMITH, P.J., and PHELPS, J., concur.

Paralel Citations

542 S.E.2d 197, 01 FCOR 9

1 See *Williams v. Eddler*, 244 Ga. 846, 850(3), 362 S.E.2d 133 (1979); *Harsh v. Eitzenberger v. Stone Corp.*, 195 Ga.App. 694, 695(1), 394 S.E.2d 618 (1990).

2 See *Boone v. Redd*, 184 Ga.App. 699, 201(2), 362 S.E.2d 480 (1987); *Hughes v. Williams*, 173 Ga.App. 392, 396(2), 331 S.E.2d 425 (1985).

3. Based on the foregoing, we need not consider Davis-Redding's remaining arguments.

Judgment reversed.

Refers to defendant Redding NOT to Petitioner (I.E. Bellinger)

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a parent to a child in the form of corporal punishment, restraint, or detention.

OCCGA § 19-13-1.

A petitioner may seek a family violence protective order for himself or herself or, as occurred here, on behalf of a minor child. OCCGA § 19-13-3(a). In the petition, the petitioner must allege "specific facts that probably cause exists to establish that family violence has occurred in the past and may occur in the future." OCCGA § 19-13-3(b). Upon the filing of a petition, the court may order temporary ex parte relief. Id. Then, within 30 days after the filing of the petition, a hearing must be held at which the petitioner "must prove the allegations of the petition by a preponderance of the evidence." OCCGA § 19-13-3(c). "If a hearing is not held within 30 days, the petition shall stand dismissed unless the parties otherwise agree." Id.

In this case, a hearing occurred within 30 days but occurred in the Paulding Superior County Court—rather than the Cobb County Superior Court, which had venue over the petition. See OCCGA § 19-13-2(a) (superior court of county where respondent resides shall have jurisdiction over family violence protective order proceedings). Given that the parties agreed for the Paulding County Superior Court to conduct the hearing, we will assume arguendo that venue was proper in the Paulding County Superior Court pursuant to the Cobb County Superior Court's October 26 order. We note that, if the Paulding County Superior Court lacked venue over the family violence order proceedings, then the father's petition would stand dismissed for failure to meet OCCGA § 19-13-3(c)'s requirement that a hearing be held within 30 days.

The record in this case does not contain the family violence petitions that the father filed in Cobb County Superior Court. Thus, it does not show the specific allegations of family violence made in those petitions. At the hearing—which, as noted above, was suspended and not reconvened—the father attempted to demonstrate that the mother had yelled at and frightened the two girls, that she had hit S.P., causing bruises on the girls' legs, and that she had hit and chased J.P. The evidence was as follows:

The girls spent a weekend visit with the father beginning on Friday, September 24, 2010. The father testified that he noticed multiple bruises, some apparently older than others, on S.P.'s legs that evening. He testified that S.P. told him that "Mommie had done it" and that "Mommie hit me." The

Juris diction
Over EV Petition
Philva Ruled
& Police Vaccated
WARRANT

[Handwritten signature]

father did not take S.P. to a "735 medical provider, but instead contacted the police and the Department of Family and Children Services. On Sunday, September 26, the father met with a Cobb County officer, told him "what was going on," and showed him S.P.'s bruises. The officer testified that S.P. first told him that she got the bruises when she fell from her bicycle. But after prompting from the father, S.P. said "My Mommie grabbed me." J.P. told the officer that the mother had hit her five times, that she had seen the mother grab and hit S.P. twice, and that she once had tried to intervene and the mother had told her to leave. The officer turned the case over to a crimes against children detective, but no criminal charges **564 were brought. The father returned the girls to the mother at the end of the weekend.

Two days later, the mother notified the father of her intent to move to Texas with the girls. The father responded, "Don't count on it!"

The next day, the father picked up the girls for a short evening visit. S.P., he testified, began crying and said the mother was hitting and beating her again. He testified that both girls said that they did not want to return to the mother and described the mother screaming, running around the apartment, and hitting them. The father called 911 and met with Paulding County law enforcement officers. A Paulding County officer testified that J.P. told him that she did not want to return to the mother because the mother "hits." S.P. would not speak to the officer. The father announced that he was not going to return the girls to the mother. The officer contacted the mother and told her that he could not make the father return the girls to her at that time.

The father also testified that J.P. had told him several times that the mother was hitting S.P., that the mother had threatened to hit J.P. if she "didn't mind her business," and that on one occasion J.P. had run and hid from the mother because the mother was loud and frightening. He said that the girls cried a lot during visits with him, looked panicked, and would tell him that they were afraid and did not want to return to the mother. The father took the girls to a child psychologist on October 16, 2010; the psychologist testified that he spoke with them for 19 minutes, during which they stated that the mother was mean, that she yelled at and spanked them, and that they did not want to move to Texas.

The father admitted at the hearing that in 1994 he accused a former wife (not the mother in this case) of abusing their daughter and that that case was dismissed. He also admitted

Formerly
Petitioner's
Statement

Philva. Cobb County, STATE OF PENNSA.

that he previously accused the mother in this case of abusing the girls and that those allegations were determined to be unfounded.

*736 The father argues that the trial court was required to grant a family violence protective order based on this evidence, because the mother did not present evidence to refute the testimony that the bruises occurred when she hit S.P. or to demonstrate that her actions were part of reasonable discipline.

We are not persuaded. In the first place, the father's argument ignores the fact that the mother was unable to present any evidence at the hearing due to the illness of the father's counsel. (The record suggests, however, that the mother would have been able to present some refuting evidence at the hearing had she been given the opportunity.)

More fundamentally, whether or not it was rebutted, the trial court was under no obligation to believe the father's evidence. As petitioner, he bore the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that an act of family violence occurred. It was the father's burden to show that any actions by the mother were not part of reasonable discipline.

Most of the father's evidence consisted of reports of statements made by the girls, who did not testify. We note that the admissibility of that evidence is questionable. See *Allen v. Clerk*, 273 Ga.App. 896, 898(1), 616 S.E.2d 213 (2005) (temporary protective order cannot rest on hearsay evidence). But we assume—without deciding—that the statements were competent evidence under the Child Hearsay Statute, OCCGA § 24-3-16, or under some other exception to the hearsay rule.

The credibility of the evidence was for the trial court, as finder of fact. See *White v. State*, 287 Ga. 713, 716(1)(D), 629 S.E.2d 291 (2010). Much of the evidence of what the father said about the mother came from the testimony of the father, who had a history of making unfounded allegations of child abuse against former wives, including the mother in this case. Notably, the only person other than the father whose testimony expressly connected the bruises on S.P.'s legs to actions of the mother was one of the police officers, who testified that S.P. first told him "i... the bruises were caused by a fall from her bicycle and only blamed the mother after prompting from the father. The trial court could have accepted this testimony as evidence that the mother caused S.P.'s bruises, but he was not required to do so. See *Id.*

In any event, the evidence presented by the father offered no context for the alleged **565 incidences of the mother hitting, yelling, chasing and being "mean." The trial court could have found from the evidence that the father had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the incidences fall outside the bounds of permissible, reasonable discipline. See *737 *Buchheit v. Stinson*, 260 Ga.App. 450, 455-456, 579 S.E.2d 833 (2003) (physical precedent only). See also *Maddox v. Bonwell*, 176 Ga.App. 492, 493-494, 336 S.E.2d 599 (1985) (filing, as a matter of law, that school-administered corporal punishment of striking student four times with wooden paddle, which had been painful to student and had resulted in "severe bruises" to his buttocks and thigh, was neither excessive nor unduly severe; "it is to be anticipated; that corporal punishment will produce pain and the potential for bruising"). Under these circumstances, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of the petition for family violence protective orders. See *Anderson*, 283 Ga.App. at ¶8(1), 642 S.E.2d 105.

3. The trial court did not err in excluding photographic evidence.

[4] The father argues that the trial court erred in refusing to admit into evidence photographs showing S.P.'s bruises. We find no error. The trial court held that the father had not yet met the "foundational requirement" for the photographs' admission, a determination that fell within that court's discretion. See *Wittler v. State*, 287 Ga.App. 465, 467(2), 652 S.E.2d 568 (2007). And although the record shows that the court suggested it would reconsider the photographs' admission, the father's counsel made no further attempt to lay a foundation for them. The decision in *Dick v. State*, 246 Ga. 697, 704(13), 273 S.E.2d 124 (1980), cited by the father, is inapposite; it concerned the failure of an appellant to perfect for appellate review an objection to a document that the trial court admitted into evidence.

4. This Court lacks jurisdiction over the father's untimely appeal from the dismissal of his change-in-custody petition.

[5] The father challenges the court's dismissal of his petition for change in custody. As detailed below, we lack jurisdiction to review this decision because it was a final judgment issued in a separate case from that involving the family violence petition and the father failed to file his application for discretionary review of the judgment within the time period required to confer jurisdiction.

Court of APPEALS of GEORGIA

~~UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA~~

Michael Bishop
Plaintiff/Petitioner,

Judge F. Cox, Sgt. J.M. Byrum
David Savoy Esq.
Defendant/Respondent.

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
REQUEST TO PROCEED
IN FORMA PAUPERIS; AUTHORIZED
WITHDRAWAL FORM; CERTIFIED
AFFIDAVIT OF INMATE ACCOUNT
STATUS.

2015 MAR 30 PM 2:50
RECEIVED IN OFFICE
CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

AFFIDAVIT AND AUTHORIZATION FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM INMATE ACCOUNT

I, Michael Bishop, being first duly sworn or under penalty of perjury, affirm and say that I am the plaintiff/petitioner in the above-styled action; that in support of my motion to proceed without prepayment of fees or costs or give security therefor pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (a)(1), I state that because of my poverty I am unable to pay the costs of said proceeding or to give security therefor.

I further swear or affirm that the responses which I have made to the questions below are true.

1. Are you presently employed? Yes () No
 - a. If employed, state the amount of your salary or wages per month and give the address of your employer. _____
 - b. If you are not currently employed, state the date of your last employment and the amount of salary or wages received. 9-15-2014 28.00 hr
2. Have you received within the past twelve months any money from any of the following sources?

a. Business, profession or self-employment?	Yes () No <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
b. Rent, payments, interest or dividends?	Yes () No <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
c. Pensions, annuities or life insurance?	Yes () No <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
d. Gifts or inheritances?	Yes () No <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
e. Any other source?	Yes () No <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

If you answered yes to any of the above, describe each source and state the amount received from each. _____

3. Do you own any cash, or do you have money in a checking or savings account? (Include funds in prison account.)
Yes () NO If the answer is yes, state the total value of items owned. _____

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CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

4. Do you own any real estate, stocks, bonds, notes, automobiles, or other valuable property, excluding ordinary household furniture and clothing?
Yes () No (X) If the answer is yes, describe the property and state its approximate value.

5. List the persons who are dependent upon you for support, state your relationship to each person, and indicate how much you contribute toward their support.

Malik Bishop	100%	SON
Lyannah Bishop	100%	Daughter
MA Kayla Smalls	100%	NEICE

AUTHORIZATION FOR ACCOUNT WITHDRAWAL

I hereby authorize my custodian and his/her designee to withdraw funds from my inmate account and to transmit the same to the Clerk, United States District Court to be applied to the filing fee which I am required to pay in connection with this case. This authorization shall apply to any institution in which I am or may be confined.

Executed this 16 day of January, 2015.

S. Love
Jan. 16, 2015



[Signature]
Signature of Plaintiff/Petitioner

PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER IS REQUIRED TO SUBMIT WITH THIS AFFIDAVIT AND AUTHORIZATION A CERTIFIED COPY OF HIS/HER INMATE ACCOUNT STATEMENT FOR THE SIX MONTH PERIOD IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE FILING OF THIS COMPLAINT.

CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that the plaintiff/petitioner herein has a current balance of \$ 0.01 in his/her inmate account at the Cobb County Adult Detention Ctr. Institution. Plaintiff has an average monthly balance for the preceding ~~3~~ 4 months of \$ 7.11, and the average monthly deposits to said account for the preceding ~~3~~ 4 months are \$ 33.75 further certify that plaintiff has the following assets to his/her credit according to the records of this institution: N/A

Date

O Wallace 2-18-15
Authorized Officer of Institution

* 4 months

VERIFICATION

I, Michael Bishop do swear and affirm under penalty of law that the statements contained in this affidavit are true. I further attest that this application for in forma pauperis status is not presented to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the costs of litigation.


I am the plaintiff in this action and know the content of the above Request to Proceed in Forma Pauperis. I verify that the answers I have given are true of my own knowledge, except as to those matters that are stated in it on my information and belief, and as to those matters I believe them to be true. I have read the perjury statute set out above and am aware of the penalties for giving any false information on this form.

Michael Bishop
Signature of Affiant Plaintiff

12-7-14
Date

Sworn to and subscribed before me this
7th day of Dec., 20 14.

S. Love
Notary Public or Other Person Authorized to Administer Oaths



Please note that under O.C.G.A. § 42-12-28, a system of an affidavit for in forma pauperis, including all attachments, shall be made upon the court and all required attachments. Failure by the petitioner to comply with this code section shall result in dismissal without prejudice of the petitioner's action.

Accounting Transactions And Balances

Today's Date: 2/18/15 9:07

Inmate Name: BISHOP, MICHAEL DANE

Current Balance: \$0.01

Booking # 000856399

Permanent # 001022761

Receipt #	Transaction Date/Time	Transaction Type	Transaction #	Withdrawals	Deposits	Cost Recovery Collected	To Cost Recovery	Balance
Inmate Detention Account								
128686	09/15/14 00:58	No Funds	607878					\$0.00
213195	09/22/14 10:27	Regular Commissary Purchase	610840					\$0.00
213777	09/23/14 11:05	CR - Medical	611652	\$5.00			\$5.00 CR - Medical	\$0.00
218712	10/13/14 10:40	Regular Commissary Purchase	620203					\$0.00
133944	10/15/14 13:37	Money Orders	621938		\$25.00	\$5.00 CR - Medical		\$20.00
220708	10/20/14 10:39	Regular Commissary Purchase	623412	\$18.04				\$1.96
222309	10/27/14 10:03	Regular Commissary Purchase	626098	\$1.96				\$0.00
225149	11/03/14 18:27	Regular Commissary Purchase	630154					\$0.00
226481	11/10/14 09:00	Regular Commissary Purchase	632551					\$0.00
228517	11/17/14 10:12	Regular Commissary Purchase	635692					\$0.00
139128	11/17/14 13:17	Money Orders	636020		\$25.00			\$25.00
*229882	11/21/14 07:56	Regular Commissary Purchase	637950	\$24.35				\$0.65
231715	12/01/14 07:55	Regular Commissary Purchase	641747	\$0.60				\$0.05
234847	12/15/14 07:17	Regular Commissary Purchase	648082					\$0.05
143295	12/15/14 12:17	Money Orders	648371		\$25.00			\$25.05
236202	12/19/14 06:48	Regular Commissary Purchase	650457	\$23.44				\$1.61
144270	12/20/14 16:54	ConnectNetwork Credit Deposit	651324		\$60.00			\$61.61
237361	12/22/14 16:59	CR - Hair Cut	652746	\$6.00		\$6.00 CR - Hair Cut		\$55.61
237909	12/29/14 07:11	Regular Commissary Purchase	654540	\$49.68				\$5.93
239664	01/05/15 07:34	Regular Commissary Purchase	657883	\$5.92				\$0.01
242734	01/19/15 07:41	Regular Commissary Purchase	664603					\$0.01
249044	02/13/15 13:44	CR - Medical	678561	\$5.00			\$5.00 CR - Medical	\$0.01
249214	02/16/15 09:25	Regular Commissary Purchase	679673					\$0.01

Inmate Name: BISHOP, MICHAEL DANE Current Balance: \$0.01 Booking # 000856399 Permanent # 001022761

Receipt #	Transaction Date/Time	Transaction Type	Transaction #	Withdrawals	Deposits	Cost Recovery Collected	To Cost Recovery	Balance
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Account Type	Current Balance
Inmate Deletion Account	\$0.01
Work Release Acct	\$0.00
Totals:	\$0.01

Assigned Cost Recovery	Balance Due
CR - Medical	\$5.00
CR - Destruction	\$0.00
CR - Postage	\$0.00
CR - Room and Board	\$0.00
CR - Indigent Purchase	\$0.00
CR - Hair Cut	\$0.00
CR - Correction	\$0.00
CR - CCT	\$0.00
CR-Ankle Monitor	\$0.00
CR - Court In Forma Pauperis	\$0.00
Totals:	\$5.00